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Pragmatic/Pragmatist Mind
Eco’s Cognitive Semioticization of Qualia
Martin Švanter
 
1. Eco’s Pragmatic Turns
1 There are (at least) two “pragmatisms” in Umberto Eco’s works about semiotics. The first
is rather close to traditional “pragmatics” (Eco 1976: 102) – this perspective is in general
close  to  the  semiotic  analysis  of  the  use  of  language  through  its  cultural  and
communicative functions. As Eco observes, 
I  have  always  defined  semiotics  as  a  logic  of  culture  and  I  still  stick  to  this
definition.  However,  cultural  processes  change and I  think that  today semiotics
should  take  into  account  new  phenomena  such  as  the  Web  as  a  maximal
encyclopedia (with all the problems concerning how to filter information – which
means  defining  the  notion  of  interpretation  again)  and  new  kinds  of
communicative intercourse such as social networks and so on. Communication with
virtual partners implies a reformulation of pragmatics. (Eco in Kull & Velmezova
2014: 539)
2 This  perspective  has  its  theoretical  base  mostly  in  Eco’s  theory  of  codes  and  his
conception  of  sign-function  as  presented  in  his  Theory  of  Semiotics  (1976)  and  in  his
semiotic critique of the theory of speech acts and encyclopedic representation based on
“pure”  semantics  in  Semiotics  and  Philosophy  of  Language  (1984).  The  most  important
perspective in these “early” texts is that semiotics is the interdisciplinary study of the
logic of the system of the culture and its “lies,” e.g., propaganda and/or ideology (cf. Eco
1970). Eco’s tendency, perhaps influenced in this way by Roman Jakobson’s pioneering
works  synthesizing  disparate  paradigms  of  sign  theory,  was  mostly  to  re-interpret,
interconnect, and in some way overcome some topics from Peircean semiotics (e.g., the
notion of interpretant) and “continental” schools of (post) structuralist semiology which
are traditionally focused on the formal system of language and its possible extrapolation
to the whole of given culture (cf. Eco 1976: 14-5; 21-8). In other words, his attempt was to
build  a  “truly  general”  semiotics  and  (in  Semiotics  and  Philosophy  of  Language)  unite
unfortunately often disparate fields of analytical philosophy and semiotics. One part of
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this grand project was to pragmaticize structuralist semiology (and also various types of
formalisms,  cf.  Eco  1999:  290)  on  the  basis  of  a  re-interpretation  of  Hjelmslev’s
glossematics (in Theory of Semiotics) which consequently led Eco to explore the possibility
of analysis of “semiosic atoms,” basic units of semiosis (cf. CP 5.484), in the fashion of
reinterpreted Greimas’  structural  semantics.  The frame, which promised to overcome
these paradigms and also further develop Peirce’s conception of abduction, was Eco’s own
theory of codes (in Semiotics and Philosophy of Language). 
3 These  topics  did  not  completely  disappear  in  Kant  and  the  Platypus  (1999)  –  Eco’s
persuasive examples1 are mostly taken from the field of cultural pragmatics, Eco is still
searching for “semiosic primitives” (Eco 1999: 144). Pragmatics is for him still prior to
syntactics and semantics – but the emphasis in the field of general semiotics substantially
shifted.  Human  cognition,  which  is  not  only  understood  from  the  social/cultural
perspective predominant in Eco’s “early and middle” works, is much more influenced by
Peirce’s  concepts  of  mind,  consciousness  and cognition.  In Kant  and the  Platypus,  Eco
proposes his version of semiotic cognitive realism – the main attempt of this text is to
explore one of various parts of this synthetic and eclectic but original perspective. Eco’s
creative  semiotic  and pragmatic  conception of  qualia  as  “bricks  of  our  cognition” is
grounded in his reinterpretation of C. S. Peirce.
 
2. Semiosic Primes
4 Analysis of basic units of semiosis, elementary units of meaning, remain in Eco’s later
work. In Kant and the Platypus, these elementary primes are not only Hjelmslev’s figurae 
(cf. Eco 1984: 21nn) or Greimasian semes, but have various forms depending on various
discourses  which  “constitute”  them.  Primes  can  be  considered  in the  dimension  of
epistemology  (and  its  pragmatic/inferential  modes  of  codes),  cognition  (as  forms  of
primary iconicity and indexicality), or general ontology, which is the most basic form (as
in the case of qualia). Therefore, Eco in Kant and the Platypus, is mostly interested in basic
function of the dynamic object, which plays the role of something purely “first,” and that
object’s two-fold character. On one side, this object (which is represented by various sets
of  immediate  objects  represented by  given representamens  and interpretants,  cf.  CP
2.274) is “really efficient but not immediately present […]” (CP 8.343), and also it is the
mode of the object that determines icon by “virtue of its own internal nature” and index
by “virtue of being in a real relation to it” (CP 8. 355). This mode of objectivity involves
the “thing” as such, or relatively (through a series of interpretants of immediate objects)
knowable “thing-in-itself” and a guarantee of the possibility that semiosis can be infinite,
but not completely “unlimited” (there is a possible “limitation” given by the dynamic
object). Conversely, as Eco has proposed in his pragmatic (not so much pragmatistic) re-
interpretation of Peirce, the “[d]ynamical Object is what drives us to produce semiosis.
We  produce  signs  because  there  is  something  that  demands  to  be  said.  To  use  an
expression  that  is  efficacious  albeit  not  very  philosophical,  the  Dynamical  Object  is
Something-that-sets-to-kicking-us and says ‘Talk!’ to us – or ‘Talk about me!’ or again,
‘Take me into consideration!’.” (Eco 1999: 14).2 Eco then postulates (due to this character
of  dynamic  objects  that  forces  its  recipient  to  some  semiosic  action)  two  forms  of
“immediate representation” of dynamic objects – “semiosic primitives.” These primes
also retain a kind of double character:  on one side they can be considered as having
rather  kind  of  dyadic  character,  being  connected  on  the  most  basic  level  (action/
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reaction/immediate attention3) to primary indexicality (Eco 1999: 14-5); on the other side,
in  case  of  primary  iconicity  (Eco  1999:  100-12nn)  they  are  rather  monadic,  simple,
connected to firstness, and Eco considers them as starting points or primum, which is “at
the  origin of  all  subsequent  inferential  processes” (Eco 2014:  563)  and therefore  the
starting  point  of  every  (more  or  less  complex)  interpretation.  These  primes  are,  in
addition to qualia, basic forms of Eco’s theory of cognition, which form this perspective to
be seemed as a basic and first level from which the interpretation grows. But as we will
see,  Eco’s  scheme  of  semiotic/pragmatic  interconnetion  between  cognition  and
interpretation is not as that simple.  For Eco,  the basic semiosic (analyzable by meta-
semiosic theory and therefore semiotics) units, are qualia, usually defined as properties of
sensations and perceptual states4 that give them their specific, qualitative or phenomenal
character (Shoemaker 1991: 507; cf. Lewis 1929; CP 6.222).5 
 
3. Semioticization of Qualia
5 In Eco’s view on the field, the problem of qualia is connected to the problem of Peirce’s
notion  of  “ground”  and  “firstness,”  and  goes  hand  in  hand  with  his  postulation  of
semiosic primitives (therefore with Eco’s interpretation of dynamic object) and through
these concepts we can explain perceptual (and also more complex – interpretative and
inferential) processes. Qualia are “bricks” for the construction of Cognitive Types (Eco
1999: 155), which mediate between the concept and the manifold of the intuition” (Eco
1999:  130),  and  they  are  here  to  stabilize  our  perceptive  acts.6 What  do  these
interconnections mean?7 
6 A semiotic exploration of the idea that every phenomenal state of mind inheres some
amount  of  qualia  presents  an  epistemological  problem.  Qualia  can  have  a  double
character: on one side, they can be mistaken for qualities as such, therefore being seen as
somewhat similar to the Platonic idea of highest genera (and the idea that pure quality has
some presupposed organization), on the other side, they should be considered as specific,
roughly speaking “realized” or  “embodied,”  qualities  in  a  specific  phenomenal  state,
therefore as a kind of “secondness.”8 Therefore Eco has asked: “Is this primum a primum
in absolute terms or is  it  a  primum for me,  at  that moment,  and (to use a Peircean
expression) is it such only in some respect or capacity?” (Eco 2014: 663; original emphasis).
7 On Peirce’s view, “[t]here is a distinctive quale to every combination of sensations so far
as it is really synthesized” (CP 6.223). He said further that “in quale-consciousness there is
but one quality, but one element. It is entirely simple” (CP 6.231). As Sandra B. Rosenthal
observes,
[t]his [...] is not meant to imply that we build up perception from atomic qualia.
What  is  immediately  recognized  as  given,  though  expressed  in  language,  is
epistemologically  prior  to  language.  And,  what  is  given as  the  percept  is  not  a
“collection”  of  atomic  qualia,  but  rather  a  gestalt  or  relation  of  qualia.  Our
immediate  recognition of  the date  of  sense is  not  of  atomic  qualia.  Rather,  the
recognized content is a unitary percept or “feeling tone” which, Peirce holds, has
its own distinctive quale, a unitary quale or experienced content which is analyzed
rather than synthesized in the process of recognition. (Rosenthal 1994: 100)
Rosenthal  further  illustrates  this  tension  (between  pure  quasi-Platonic  ideality  and
existence in phenomenal states) in conception of quale – for Peirce each quale is monadic
in a specific (quasi-Leibnizian) notion – it is in itself what it is for itself, and does not refer
to any other (CP 6.224). Qualia “in themselves” are “absolutely simple” and “absolutely
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free” (Rosenthal 1994: 101). On the other side they are “here” to be kind of (“rhematic”)
guaranty for further possible (inferential) “comparison”: in the first of third as qualisigns;
in the first of second of third as “proto-propositions” – dicisigns; or in the second of second of
third as material propositions etc. – because “comparing consciousness does pronounce
them to be alike. They are alike to the comparing consciousness, though neither alike nor
unlike in themselves.” (CP 6.224). As Rosenthal concludes, “[t]he repeatability of qualia,
then, is itself a product of the synthesizing activity of consciousness acting upon unique
qualia. […] Such a characterization leads Peirce to speak of Firstness in terms of qualities
of feeling.” (Rosenthal 1999: 100-1), deploying firstness in epistemological and ontological
terms, compared to the strictly psychological or cognitive sense.
On the contrary, Eco’s analysis is guided rather by the cognitive dimension of qualia. It
seems that  for  Eco the most  important  is  the idea,  that  qualia  as  feelings  have this
capacity  which  forces  us  (the  consciousness)  to  specific  action,  as  he  noted:  “Peirce
himself made clear, even after recognizing that my senses have been deceived, I cannot
say that I have not experienced (let alone ‘that I have not known’!) a sensation of redness
or excessive heat. Going back to the housewife with her sheet, she might say: ‘A short
time ago, after having made my first over-hasty perceptual inference, I entertained the
belief [(a cognitive fact)] that I had experienced a sensation of whiteness’.” (Eco 2014:
662). On the other hand, qualia are not the same as percepts, which have a structure and
combine a number of sense qualities. The problem is that, for Eco, Peirce’s Ground can be
seen  as  the  “degenerated”  or  rather  “quasi-structured”  kind  of  firstness  which  (for
Peirce) cannot be in principle “degenerated,” because “[f]irst is simple and devoid of
structure. But every percept has a First which is the single impression created by the total
ensemble of its elements. Moreover, if a single sense quality of a percept is prescinded
from all the rest and is considered by itself, such a quality is a First.” (Murphey 1961: 395).
Eco’s point of view is different: although qualia are monadic and “first and simple” but
(similar to semiosic primitives) cause specific kind of actions (therefore they are in this
sense  not  quit  causally  “impotent”),  as  he  states:  “Peirce  is  swinging  between  two
notions: in one sense, as we have seen, the Ground is an idea, a skeleton plan, but if it is
such, it is already an Immediate Object, a full realization of Thirdness; in another sense it
is a Likeness that does not resemble anything. All it says to me is that the sensation I feel
is in some way emanated by the Dynamical Object.” (Eco 1999: 103).
Eco’s pragmatic deterritorialization of Peirce’s categories starts with the reinterpretation
of ground9 mentioned above which in his view seems to be simply equal to the firstness,
iconicity and qualia,  and primarily to the dynamic object,  that forces us to “say that
something is there” and “[f]rom that moment interpretation may begin, but forward, not
backward” (Eco 1999:  100).  As he simply puts it,  “I  think that,  when Peirce says the
Ground  is  a  quality,  he  means  to  say  what  philosophy  still  defines  today  as  the
phenomenon of qualia” (Eco 1999: 100). But for Peirce the ground is more an “analytical
term”  (the  ground  is  “pure  abstraction,  reference  to  which  constitutes  a  quality  or
general attribute,” CP 1.550),10 which is in his later conception of semiotics is abandoned
or “dissolved” in other aspects of semiosis (Letter to Lady Welby). In Grammatica Speculativa
(CP 2.228), ground takes on a bifurcated character – (i) the ground of signification, which
in this conception perhaps means that every sign-relation has to be based on specific
reference  to  quality,  which is  represented by  given quale  (“what  is,”  cf.  CP 1.55)  of
specific sign-relation, and (ii) a contra-intuitive “sort of idea“ which is to be:
[...] understood in a sort of Platonic sense, very familiar in everyday talk; I mean in
that sense in which we say that one man catches another man’s idea, in which we
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say that when a man recalls what he was thinking of at some previous time, he
recalls the same idea, and in which when a man continues to think anything, say for
a tenth of a second, in so far as the thought continues to agree with itself during
that time, that is  to have a like content,  it  is  the same idea,  and is not at each
instant of the interval a new idea. (CP 2.227)
8 Eco explores both these sides of the ground or, in his view, character of quale: on one
side,  there  is  something  that  has  qualitative  character  of  the  firstness  that  is  the
possibility of correlation and relation of future form of signification and, on the other
side, it has this every-day communicative character. This character is truly (!) “platonic”:
if we want to “catch” (not necessary yet “understand” – that is why we can speak about
“primary indexicalism”) another man/woman idea, we have to have some kind of proto-
knowledge (ability to perceive and synthetize) of what he/she is talking about in the
sense  of  emotional  intepretants  –  there  is  a  “tone”  of  his/her  voice  (and  therefore
“primary iconism”),  which takes my attention instead of,  e.g.,  bird singing (“primary
indexicalism”), which later generates more complex forms of inferences, and therefore
communication. We can see here clear analogy to Eco’s conception of Cognitive Type (and
mere possibility for referential competence and felicitous reference, cf. Eco 1999: 155).
9 The  importance  of  qualia  for  Eco  is  that  they  highlight  the  fact  that  in  primary
(absolutely  simple)  intuition  there  is  no  “starting point,”  but  –  in  the  same way  of
firstness – there is a general predicate of many different objects, which, given its “purity”
and “simplicity” cannot be in principle criticized, i.e., for Eco, qualia are “not rational, yet
capable  of  rationalization”  (cf.  CP  5.119).  Eco  analyzes  qualia  in  this  manner  –  as
mediators between perceptual (and other following) judgment and “tone of cognition”:
he defines them as being resistant to all possible criticism. Peirce “is telling us not that
the sensation of red is ‘infallible’ but that, once it has been, even if we then realize that
we were wrong, it is still beyond doubt that it has been […].” (Eco 1999: 102). Eco follows
the aforementioned Peircean concept of “comparing consciousness” based on relational
possibility which qualia can “rise”; a housewife sees: 
[a]  freshly  washed  sheet  as  extremely  white  but  then,  after  comparing  it  with
another, admits that the second is whiter than the first. […] Peirce would have told
us  that  the  housewife  initially  perceived  the  whiteness  of  the  first  sheet  (pure
“tone” of awareness); then, once she had moved on to the recognition of the object
(Secondness)  and  had  begun  a  comparison  full  of  inferences  (Thirdness),
discovering that whiteness is manifested by degrees, she could state that the second
sheet  is  whiter  than  the  first,  but  at  the  same  time  she  could  not  cancel  the
preceding impression, which as a pure quality has been […]. (Eco 1999: 102)
10 Eco sees the problem in comparison and gradation, 
[h]ow is  it  that  a  pure  quality  (Firstness),  which  should be  the  immediate  and
unrelated  point  of  departure  of  all  subsequent  perceptions,  can  function  as  a
predicate, and therefore already has been named, if semiosis is established only in
Thirdness? And how is it, all knowledge being inference, that we have a point of
departure that cannot be inferential, since it manifests itself immediately without
even having been discussed or denied? (Ibid.) 
11 Eco’s pragmatic answer is that, “we must liberate […] the concept of likeness from the
concept of comparison” (1999: 103), which Eco demonstrates with the example of icon (as
a sign determined by dynamic object by the virtue of its own internal nature), which is a
phenomenon “that founds all possible judgments of likeness, but it cannot be founded on
likeness itself” and therefore is not a mental image (Eco 1999: 103). 
 
Pragmatic/Pragmatist Mind
European Journal of Pragmatism and American Philosophy, X-1 | 2018
5
4. Mind as Composition of Three Universes of
Experience with the Accent on Its Pragmatic
Dimension
12 Eco’s understanding of qualia is novel because of its two-fold character; in the first place
they are considered to be firstness-based aspects of mentality, and in the second place
they are gaining some kind of communicative character. In the complex understanding of
consciousness  Eco  proposes  in  Kant  and  the  Platypus,  qualia  play  an  important  and
irreplaceable role as fundamental bases of cognitive types. If we sum up Eco’s cognitive
re-intepretation of Peirce’s categories, the phenomenal state is first composed of general
potentiality (cf.  CP 6.187),  which has “the innocence of firstness,” but it  is  Eco’s still
partially “cultural” (cf. Eco 1999: 5) point of view which allows him to avoid Peircean
absolute  idealism  of  the  “thinking  universe”  (cf.  Stjernfelt  2007:  43)  or  the  “magic
idealism à la Novalis” (Eco 2014: 671) restricted by the “nature” of given “Umwelt” or the
set-up of cognitive types of concrete phenomenal state. The “Umwelt” is the mixture of
social and natural – as Eco has shown in marvelous examples Marco Polo’s inductive
observation of the unicorn/rhinoceros, or Montezuma’s complex investigation of a horse
– in the former, Marco had to make the token of a type more complex, but it did not lead
to the revolution of paradigmatic vocabulary in contemporary zoology; in the latter, the
example of gradated interpretation went from points of experience to Molar Content.
This dimension of general potentiality of cognition is restrictive in this specific sense –
historically,  socially and ontologically.  Trivially put – conquistadors did not arrive by
Boeing, they were Christians, i.e., had a specific worldview (as did the Aztecs), and most
importantly, their horses were not flying. They could possibly breathe fire (there are
signs – of primary indexicality – of panting and neighing), but could not fly. In other
words, the sphere of ontology returns to old Platonic/Aristotelian postulations of the
possible incompatibility of the proposition and reality (“Theaetetus also cannot fly”), but
Eco’s  view avoids  these problems with the help of  his  mixture of  semiotic  cognitive
realism and pragmatic/cultural point of view (based on re-interpretation of Peirce and
Kant), which enables him also to avoid traditional philosophical problems connected to
idealistic  or  empirical  perspectives.  The  semiotic  perspective  here  is  simple  –  the
inferential process (and therefore the connection of language and reality) differs due to
the dimension of interpretation, or interpretive discourse – of cognition, nucleus and
molarity. On the other hand, these discourses are not constructed only socially by the
semiologic  system,  but  by  a  quasi-foundation  in  “embodied”  qualities  of  perceptual
semiosis,  which  is  “not  when  something  stands  for  something  else  but  when  from
something, by an inferential process, we come to pronounce a perceptual judgment on
that same something and not on anything else” (Eco 1999: 126). This general potentiality
has  some  aspects  of  Peircean  firstness,  but  does  not  overlap  with  it  –  a  basic
presupposition for another complex dimension of mental states (inferential processes),
by advancing to Peircean firstness, this hypothetical potentiality can be articulated more
specifically. 
13 The second dimension from which mental states are composed of is therefore factuality,
which is closer to Peirce’s secondness, because it represents the dynamism, rhythm and
inevitable temporality of  cognitive process.  Perceptual  semiosic mind is  not a “static
state,” but due to the first dimension it is always a series of options, a field where qualia
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are still inherent to produce meaning (cf. Eco 1999: 274) which has to be based on this
“brute force” of  “existence or constant struggle” of  objects,  which are “kicking” our
attention and demand more or less complex responses. Therefore, there is no privileged
stream  of  consciousness,  no  Cartesian  theatre.  There  are  only  realized  options  and
qualitative  “environment,”  which  may  or  may  not  be  acknowledged  in  concrete
situations.
14 There is also a third dimension which is molar articulation, i.e. words: this sheet is not
only “extremely white,” but this washing machine is better, and this detergent has better
chemical  structure  –  we  can  see  here  clearly  one  of  many  aspects  of  “Ecoistic”
pragmatism – some of “bricks” of cognitive types can be the base (“blending” punctual
cognitive acts with semantics and pragmatics) for future complex rules or laws. In this
post-Peircean  perspective,  Eco  suggests  his  semiotic/cognitive/pragmatic  model  of
consciousness  which  consists  of  qualities  (which  are  necessary  but  not  literally
“essential”),  facts/existence,  and propositions  and arguments  about  these  situations/
facts/premises/propositions. Eco has presented a provocative teleological and temporal
model of semiosic mind.
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NOTES
1. Kantian  schematism  and  Peirce’s  semiotics  are  often  challenged  by  Eco’s  “punctual”  and
colorful examples. The “example” and “punctum of the example” (e.g. of Platypus) itself are one
of many topics of Eco’s narration in Kant and the Platypus (cf. Eco 1999: 7).
2. Cf.  Paolucci  (2017:  48):  “For  Peirce,  the  emergence  of  firstnesses  through their  reciprocal
opposition (secondness), is an event (CP 6.200), that is, a singularity, a point in which something
happens.”  As  Eco has  emphasized (Eco 2014:  662):  “[F]or  Peirce the three categories  are not
cognitions but formal structures that found the possibility of all cognition (in this sense Peirce
was a Kantian), or they are not kinds of experience but pure forms that make up experience.
Therefore,  if  a  sensation of  redness  is  an  example  of  Firstness  or,  in  one of  the  examples  I
provided at the time, the burning I feel when I touch a hot coffeepot, this Firstness in itself is still
nothing from the point of view of my cognitions (a ‘mere maybe’), and I recognize it as a burn
from the coffeepot only if it is immediately placed in relation to Secondness and Thirdness.”
3. Cf. Eco (1999: 145): “When we feel on the arm or the hand the presence of a foreign body, no
matter  how  small,  occasionally  without  even  looking  (and  sometimes  the  interval  between
perceptual  hypothesis  and motor response is  infinitesimal),  either we use the other hand to
squash something, or we prime the index finger with the thumb to flick something away. Usually
we squash when we have assumed (even before having decided, because our safety depends on
the speed of our reflexes) that the presence is a mosquito or some other bothersome insect, and
we flick the body away when we assume it is vegetable or mineral waste. If it is decided that we
must  ‘kill,’  it  is  because a  feature of  animality  in  the foreign body has  been noticed.  It  is  a
primary recognition, preconceptual (in any case prescientific), having to do with perception and
not with categorial knowledge (if anything, it orients categorial knowledge, it offers itself as a
basis for interpretation at higher cognitive levels).” (Cf. Eco 2014: 663).
4. “[A]sensation of redness, a burning feeling, the whiteness of a sheet.” (Eco 2014: 662).
5. “It is frequently argued that the phenomenological or qualitative features of our sensations
will never be satisfactorily reduced by a purely materialistic neuroscience. They constitute, it is
often said, a permanent barrier to the reductive aspirations of physicalism.” (Churchland 1984:
773).
6. In Kant and the Platypus Eco distinguished Cognitive Types, which are built from qualia – when I
touch the hot coffee pot and burn my hand, it is very probable that I will withdraw my hand from
it in the future (or if Claudio will kick me – “with no reason” in the knee, I will be aware of him
next  time)  –  my  behavior  will  be  in  this  sense  “typical,”  constructed  from  experienced,
“punctual” qualia. Eco’s point is that this “typicality” (which is articulated and public, therefore
it is a kind of set of interpretants and/or habits) cannot be experienced or “followed,” if there is
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no starting point based on “feeling” or “tone” – even if this “feeling” was an illusion etc. These
cognitive types produce “meaning”, or in better words (because are not necessary connected to
mental experience): Nuclear Contents (NC), i.e. more complex habits. As Eco has noted, NC “suppl
[y] criteria or instructions for the identification of one of the tokens of the type (or rather, as
they say,  for  the  identification of  the  referent).  I  use  ‘identification’  instead of  ‘recognition’
because I should like to reserve the latter term for cognitive phenomena strictly dependent on a
previous perceptual experience, and the former term for the capacity to identify perceptually
something about which we still have no experience. I identified an alligator, the first time I saw
one on the banks of the Mississippi, on the basis of the instructions that had been supplied to me
previously  through  words  and  images.  That  is,  the  NC  of  the  word  alligator  had  been
communicated to me.” (Eco 1999: 393). Third of this scheme is Molar Content, which represents
most complex “cerebral” habits – as e.g. in the case of scientific/encyclopedic knowledge and its
(meta)categorization (e.g. alligator as the the object of zoology), cf. Eco (1999: 142nn).
7. Firstly,  it  is  important  to  say  that  in  Kant  and  the  Platypus Eco  brightly  avoided dramatic
discussion  of  philosophers  of  mind  about  qualia  and  “qualophilia.”  His  analogy  of  Peircean
consideration of the connection of “ground,” “quality” and “judgment” is quite distant from the
discussions between as D. Dennet, C. McGinn, T. Nagel, P. Churchland etc.; at least Eco used very
different (more old “fashioned” – Peircean and Kantian) vocabulary and his “solution of qualia”
is also very distant from empirical point of view of “empirical” neurophilosophy (presented by
contemporary philosophers as e.g. J. Prinz).
8. Therefore the interpretation of this problem as “firstness is a quality, secondness is quale and
thirdness is qualisign“ (as proposed by Chumley & Harkness 2013: 5) is at least very simplistic.
9. Cf. Eco (1999: 62; original emphasis): “In the Ground the object is seen in a certain respect, the
attention  isolates  one  feature.  In  purely  logical  terms,  it  is  evident  that  if  I  predicate  the
blackness of ink, I  do not predicate its liquidity. But if  we were to cleave to the logical value of
the Ground,  we would not  get  very far.  At  most  we would find ourselves  once more among
examples  that  seem  to  confuse  our  ideas  rather  than  clarify  them,  prisoners  of  compulsive
Peircean triadism. Moreover, the choice of the term Ground is not one of the happiest: it suggests
a background against which something is set,  while Peirce’s view was that it  was probably a
something set against a background that was still indistinct.”
10. Cf.  (CP 1550): “Reference to a ground cannot be prescinded from being, but being can be
prescinded from it.”
ABSTRACTS
The paper deals with the problem of qualia in the context of Umberto Eco‘s semiotics. I propose
that Eco started to focus specifically on the problem of qualia mostly in his later period when he
turned from the  idea  of  almost  universal  theory  of  semiotics  (e.g.,  in  Theory  of  Semiotics)  to
cognitive realism (in Kant and the Platypus)  with the help of more precise reinterpretation of
Peirce’s concepts. Eco’s view of the problem of qualia is closely connected to his understanding of
cognitive  processes  of  understanding  leading  from  cognitive  type  to  molar  content  –
understanding qualia as “semiosis primes,” which are the fundamental base of the possibility of
all signification, therefore as a base of cognitive types. On the other hand, qualia are considered
to be a base of cognitive types; thus we should regard them as having every-day communicative
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character. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to explore this specific two-fold understanding of
qualia in the context of Eco’s and Peirce’s semiotic. 
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